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INTERNET TAXATION WITHOUT PHYSICAL 
REPRESENTATION?: STATES SEEK SOLUTION TO STOP 
E-COMMERCE SALES TAX SHORTFALL 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Why pay more when you can pay less?”  In addition to being used in 
marketing campaigns, this phrase has become the governing principle for many 
of today’s Internet1 shoppers.  Unfortunately for revenue-seeking states, what 
enables consumers to pay less may not be competitive retail pricing, but the 
absence of sales tax charged on Internet purchases. 
The Internet has unquestionably impacted commerce from the consumer, 
vendor, and governmental perspectives, giving consumers unprecedented 
access to vendors in all states and internationally without leaving home.2  The 
ease with which consumers and vendors are able to transact business over long 
distances has created a host of novel problems for state governments generally, 
and the amorphous nature of the Internet has had a particularly acute effect on 
taxation of retail sales.3 
It is well settled that in intrastate transactions a seller can be required to 
collect and remit sales taxes to the state revenue agency.4  Equally well settled 
is that a consumer who purchases goods from an out-of-state, or remote, 
vendor in a transaction where sales tax is not charged, must self-report a use 
tax to the state where the product is consumed.5  Few consumers actually 
report such transactions or remit a use tax,6 despite being legally required, 
 
 1. The Internet is collectively defined as “the myriad of computer and telecommunications 
facilities, including equipment and operating software, which comprise the interconnected world-
wide network of networks that employ the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol, or 
any predecessor or successor protocols to such protocol, to communicate information of all kinds 
by wire or radio.”  Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1104(4), 112 Stat. 2681 
(1998). 
 2. See Dennis M. Kennedy, Key Legal Concerns in E-Commerce: The Law Comes to the 
New Frontier, 18 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 17, 18 (2001) (describing the myriad services available 
to consumers through the Internet). 
 3. See discussion infra at notes 50–54. 
 4. Timothy A. Hart, Taxing E-Commerce: The Sales and Use Tax Question, 37 TULSA L. 
REV. 397, 398 (2001). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id.; Ryan J. Swartz, The Imposition of Sales and Use Taxes on E-Commerce: A Taxing 
Dilemma for States and Remote Sellers, 2 J. HIGH TECH. L. 143, 144 (2003). 
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either because they are unaware of their obligation,7 or because of the 
negligible risk of being caught.8 
Historically, consumer noncompliance was tolerated because the cost of 
collecting the tax outstripped the revenues generated.9  The proliferation of 
Internet sales has changed this equation.  The prevalence of out-of-state 
transactions consummated over the Internet has vastly increased the volume of 
revenue being lost to states, and has created a corresponding rise in the 
importance of collecting a use tax.10 
Remote vendors, however, cannot be forced to collect sales or use taxes 
from consumers unless the vendor has a substantial nexus within the taxing 
jurisdiction.11  The substantial nexus test is frustrated by the shapeless nature 
of the Internet, which allows e-tailers12 to be physically present in only one 
state while selling goods in every other state and internationally.13  The current 
law arises from the Supreme Court’s decisions relating to mail-order catalogue 
sales, arguably the most nearly analogous method of transacting sales.  In 
particular, National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois14 
and Quill Corp. v. North Dakota15 invoked the Due Process16 and Commerce 
Clauses17 to restrict a state’s ability to force remote vendors to collect a use 
tax.18  In Quill, the Court invited Congress to take action in this politically 
charged area to reach a decision that would appease the numerous competing 
 
 7. Jaime Klima, Mom & Pop v. Dot-com: A Disparity in Taxation Based on How You 
Shop?, 2002 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 28, ¶ 15, http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/ 
2002dltr0028.html. 
 8. See Brian S. Masterson, Collecting Sales and Use Tax on Electronic Commerce: E-
Confusion or E-Collection, 79 N.C. L. REV. 203, 221 (2000) (discussing the potential economic 
discrimination present to underprivileged consumers who cannot participate in e-commerce or 
benefit from the resulting absence of sales tax). 
 9. Hart, supra note 4, at 400–01 (noting the costs inherent in hiring additional personnel to 
conduct audits of numerous low-dollar transactions and to prosecute violations). 
 10. Id. 
 11. See discussion infra at notes 75–91. 
 12. An “e-tailer” is a vendor that engages in electronic commerce.  Electronic commerce 
means “any transaction conducted over the Internet or through Internet access, comprising the 
sale, lease, license, offer, or delivery of property, goods, services, or information, whether or not 
for consideration, and includes the provision of Internet access.”  Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. 
L. No. 105-277, § 1104(3), 112 Stat. 2681 (1998). 
 13. Hart, supra note 4, at 401. 
 14. 386 U.S. 754 (1967). 
 15. 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
 16. “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 17. “The Congress shall have Power To . . . regulate commerce with foreign nations, and 
among the several States.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 18. See discussion infra. 
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interests.19  States have not waited on the sidelines for Congress to accept this 
invitation, but in an effort to satisfy the constitutional roadblocks, have drafted 
an agreement that if fully complied with would alleviate burdens on remote 
vendors and achieve taxing uniformity.20 
This Article begins with a general discussion of sales and use taxes.  Next, 
it will discuss the difficulties of collecting a use tax and the constitutional 
impediments that preclude a state from forcing a remote vendor lacking a 
substantial nexus with the taxing state to collect use taxes.  The Article will 
then examine actions Congress has taken to reach a solution, as well as the 
states’ own initiatives to prevent Internet transactions from crippling their 
revenue collection.  The Article concludes with a defense of the state-led 
initiative and suggestions to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of use tax 
collection on individual taxpayers. 
II.  SALES TAX 
The most common and substantial form of sales tax is that applied to retail 
sales.21  It is usually levied on sales or leases of tangible personal property, but 
is extended to cover intangible products and services in some taxing 
jurisdictions.22  The sales tax originated in the Mississippi legislature in 1932 
as a revenue-generating measure in response to the Great Depression.23  It has 
since spread into forty-five states and the District of Columbia.24  Currently, 
more than 7,600 state and local governments impose a sales tax,25 which along 
 
 19. Quill, 504 U.S. at 318 (“[T]he underlying issue is not only one that Congress may be 
better qualified to resolve, but also one that Congress has the ultimate power to resolve.”). 
 20. See discussion infra. 
 21. Shane Padgett Morris, Interstate Commerce and the Future of State Sales and Use 
Taxes, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1393, 1395 (2003). 
 22. Id. (“[A] sales tax by definition in most states is imposed on the sale of all tangible 
personal property except property specifically excluded, but it is not imposed on the sale of 
services unless the service is specifically included.”). 
 23. John E. Sununu, The Taxation of Internet Commerce, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 325, 326 
(2002). 
 24. Id. at 327.  No sales or use tax is imposed in Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New 
Hampshire, or Oregon.  Id. at 327 n.9. 
 25. Swartz, supra note 6, at 144; see also ADVISORY COMMISSION ON ELECTRONIC 
COMMERCE, REPORT TO CONGRESS, 17 (Apr. 2000), available at 
http://www.ecommercecommission.org.  Of the forty-five states that impose a sales tax, thirty-
three allow local jurisdictions to impose an additional sales tax.  See ADVISORY COMMISSION ON 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, supra, at 17; David T. Brown, Note, No Easy Solutions in the Sales 
Tax on E-Commerce Debate: Lessons from the Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce 
Report to Congress, 27 J. CORP. L. 117, 119 (2001). 
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with use tax, accounted for more than one-third (35.8%) of total revenue for 
the states in 2004.26 
The sales tax is distinct from income and use taxes in that the burden is on 
the vendor rather than the consumer to collect and remit it to the proper 
governmental body.27  As will be discussed, this obligation only rests on a 
vendor if it has a substantial nexus within the taxing state.  Therefore, vendors 
that operate largely over the Internet or through mail-order catalogues may 
escape the onerous administrative burden of collecting and remitting sales tax 
on the consumer’s behalf for sales made to out-of-state buyers.28  For those 
consumers and transactions, the use tax takes effect. 
III.  USE TAX 
“A use tax is defined in most states as a tax on the use, storage, or 
consumption of tangible personal property within the state.”29  Rather than 
being a tax burden in addition to sales tax, the use tax is complementary, and is 
applied to the use of products within a state not previously subjected to a sales 
tax.30  The main difference between the use and sales tax is purchaser 
location.31  An intrastate transaction will trigger a sales tax, whereas an 
interstate transaction will generate a use tax.32  States utilize use taxes to 
discourage their residents from purchasing products out-of-state in order to 
avoid sales tax.33  Therefore, the use tax rate in a state is typically identical to 
the rate charged for state sales tax.34  To prevent being taxed twice on the same 
purchase, and to avoid a resulting dormant Commerce Clause challenge, a 
taxpayer must receive a credit against a state’s use tax for any sales tax paid in 
another state.35 
In theory, the combination of sales and use taxes should lead to the proper 
collection of tax on all eligible transactions, whether made within or outside 
the taxing state.  For example, a consumer who makes a traditional purchase 
 
 26. Todd Stanford Snyder, Ending the Internet Tax Moratorium, 60 J. MO. B. 66, 67 (2004); 
see U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, NATIONAL TOTALS OF STATE TAX REVENUE, BY TYPE OF 
TAX, (Nov. 19, 2004), available at http://www.census.gov/govs/qtax. 
 27. Swartz, supra note 6, at 144. 
 28. See id. at 143 (discussing e-tailers’ ability to exploit sales tax laws when sales are made 
to out-of-state consumers). 
 29.  Morris, supra note 21, at 1396. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Sununu, supra note 23, at 327. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Swartz, supra note 6, at 144. 
 34. See Klima, supra note 7, at ¶ 15.  Sales tax rates range from one percent to eleven 
percent in some local jurisdictions.  Sununu, supra note 23, at 327. 
 35. This is an example of the application of the “dormant” Commerce Clause.  In this 
capacity it represents a limitation on a state’s ability to hinder interstate commerce by means of 
double taxation.  See Morris, supra note 21, at 1396. 
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from the corner brick-and-mortar store will pay sales tax because the vendor is 
required to collect and remit the tax to the state’s department of revenue.  
Likewise, a sale made through a remote vendor (a vendor without a physical 
presence in the taxing state), whether a traditional mail-order vendor or an e-
tailer, will obligate the purchaser to self-report the tax in the form of a use 
tax.36  In either situation, the state will receive the tax revenue without any “tax 
leakage.” 
IV.  REALITY DEPARTS FROM THEORY 
A. Tax Leakage 
Despite the theoretical balance created by sales and use taxes, the reality is 
far different,37 and use taxes go largely uncollected.38  Indeed, the use tax has 
been called the “most ignored tax on the books.”39  Failure to collect tax 
revenue has not been created because e-commerce is not taxed; rather, “[t]he 
problem is that the ability to transact untaxed commerce is now exponentially 
easier than it has ever been in the history of the world.”40  The lack of 
collection has two main causes.41  First, most consumers are unaware of the 
obligation to self-report use tax.42  A common misperception is that if the 
vendor does not collect a sales tax, then the consumer is under no obligation to 
pay.  Second, this misperception is perpetuated among consumers because the 
payment of use tax is rarely enforced.43  States have substantial difficulty in 
monitoring and collecting consumers’ use tax payments.44  No reliable audit 
procedure exists that can accurately and economically determine an 
individual’s purchasing behavior.45  Major consumer purchases, such as 
automobiles, which require the purchase to be registered with the state, are one 
 
 36. See Hart, supra note 4, at 398. 
 37. The National Governors Association estimated that state governments lost $27 billion in 
2004 from uncollected online sales taxes and would lose another $41 billion in 2005.  Ian Ritter, 
Fight Heats Up over E-tail Tax, Apr. 2003, http://www.icsc.org/srch/sct/current. 
 38. See Masterson, supra note 8, at 206 (“Absent substantive reform in the collection of use 
tax on interstate commerce, the states will continue to lose use tax revenue that buyers clearly 
owe under existing laws.”). 
 39. H.R. REP. NO. 107-240, at 37 (2001). 
 40. Hart, supra note 4, at 401. 
 41. See id. at 398 (“Nexus determination and calculation of [sales and use tax] are the main 
challenges for sellers, while ignorance and enforceability are the biggest obstacles to consumer 
collection.”). 
 42. Swartz, supra note 6, at 144. 
 43. Masterson, supra note 8, at 205. 
 44. Sununu, supra note 23, at 327–28. 
 45. See id. at 328. 
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of the few areas where use tax payments are regularly collected.46  A 
registration requirement is, however, impractical with small, everyday 
purchases.47  In addition, the tracking of Internet purchasing behavior to 
determine compliance with use tax laws would create a host of technological 
and privacy concerns.48 
A final hurdle to use tax collection is simple non-cooperation with tax 
laws.49  Even for the rare consumer who is aware of the obligation to remit use 
taxes, the knowledge that disobedience will likely go unpunished contributes to 
the problem.  Use tax non-compliance before the widespread use of the 
Internet primarily occurred through purchases made by mail-order catalogues 
and high-priced items shipped out of state, such as furniture and jewelry.50  
While this loss of tax revenue has always troubled states, the advent of the 
Internet has exacerbated use tax leakage.51  Now, consumers may purchase 
virtually any item through a remote e-tailer that lacks substantial nexus with 
the taxing state, thereby avoiding sales tax, and may choose not to voluntarily 
pay use tax, secure in the knowledge that this choice will likely go undetected 
and unchallenged by the state.  Currently, Internet purchases make up only 
2.2% of total retail sales;52 however, the growth of such sales has been 
exponential, increasing at four times the rate of overall retail sales.53  It is 
estimated that this growth, coupled with the lack of use tax collection, could 
lead to a loss in state tax revenue of $55 billion during the next ten years.54 
As the Internet continues to grow in popularity, successful tax collection 
under the current system will inevitably continue to deteriorate.55  States are 
concerned that the current trend, if continued, will eviscerate their ability to 
 
 46. See JOHN F. DUE & JOHN L. MIKESELL, SALES TAXATION: STATE AND LOCAL 
STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION 275 (2d ed. 1994); Charles E. McLure, Jr., Sales and Use 
Taxes on Electronic Commerce: Legal, Economic, Administrative, and Political Issues, 34 URB. 
LAW. 487, 489 (2002). 
 47. See Swartz, supra note 6, at 144 (“Taxing authorities have difficulty identifying the 
online purchasing activity of buyers, making enforcement of the use tax administratively 
impossible.”). 
 48. See id. 
 49. See Klima, supra note 7, at ¶ 1. 
 50. See DUE & MIKESELL, supra note 46, at 275; Sununu, supra note 23, at 331 (discussing 
the argument that the development of the Internet created a “legal loophole” exempting new 
classes of transactions from sales tax). 
 51. See Klima, supra note 7, at ¶ 13 (comparing the explosive growth of Internet sales with 
the modest growth of traditional retail sales). 
 52. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Quarterly Retail E-Commerce Sales 2nd Quarter 
2005 (Aug. 19, 2005), http://www.census.gov/mrts/www/data/pdf/05Q2.pdf. 
 53. Klima, supra note 7, at ¶ 13. 
 54. See id. at ¶ 14. 
 55. See Sununu, supra note 23, at 328 (arguing that a national approach to the taxing 
dilemma has increased in importance as the Internet grows in popularity). 
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perform basic governmental functions.56  The failure to collect use tax from 
individual consumers may cause states to focus on collections from remote 
vendors as a solution.57  This would be an optimal answer, but the Supreme 
Court has seemingly foreclosed that option by holding that the ability of a state 
to require remote vendors to collect use tax is limited to those remote vendors 
with a substantial nexus in the taxing state.58 
B. Constitutional Preclusion 
The imposition of taxes on remote vendors triggers two potential 
constitutional challenges.  First, the Due Process Clause prevents a state from 
taxing entities over which it does not have jurisdiction.59  Second, the dormant 
Commerce Clause prevents a state from unfairly burdening interstate 
commerce.60  These constitutional issues only arise in the context of use taxes, 
as opposed to sales taxes, since sales taxes by nature apply solely to intrastate 
transactions in which a state clearly has jurisdiction over the seller and no 
interstate trade is affected.61  The use tax, however, is implicated in interstate 
sales, where a state may not have the required jurisdiction and interstate trade 
would be burdened by tax collection regulations.62 
Currently, it appears no statutory authority governs what “minimum 
contacts”63 are necessary to establish jurisdiction over a remote vendor.  
Likewise, no statute dictates what “substantial nexus”64 a remote vendor must 
have with a taxing state to satisfy the Commerce Clause.  Despite this lack of 
guidance, the Supreme Court has spoken in the analogous area of mail-order 
sales.65  The seminal Supreme Court cases in this area are National Bellas 
 
 56. See generally id. at 326–27 (noting that the sales tax has been the largest source of state 
revenue for over fifty years). 
 57. See generally Morris, supra note 21, at 1393–94. 
 58. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313 (1992). 
 59. See Morris, supra note 21, at 1399. 
 60. See id.; Quill, 504 U.S. at 309, 313.  The “dormant” nature of the Commerce Clause 
recognizes that the Commerce Clause acts not solely as a source of congressional authority, but 
also implicitly as a limitation on state power.  See Sununu, supra note 23, at 329.  “[T]he 
Commerce Clause is more than an affirmative grant of power; it has a negative sweep as 
well . . . .”  Id. (quoting Quill, 504 U.S. at 309).  “The Clause . . . prohibits certain state actions 
that interfere with interstate commerce.”  Id. (quoting Quill, 504 U.S. at 309). 
 61. Morris, supra note 21, at 1398 (noting that a retail sales tax is always intrastate, and 
therefore personal jurisdiction to tax a purchaser buying property within the taxing state always 
exists). 
 62. See id. 
 63. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. and Placement, 326 U.S. 
310, 316 (1945). 
 64. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 313; Snyder, supra note 26, at 67.   
 65. Snyder, supra note 26, at 67. 
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Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois66 and Quill Corp. v. North 
Dakota.67 
National Bellas Hess (National) was incorporated in Delaware and had its 
principal place of business in Missouri.68  National’s incorporation and 
principal place of business clearly amounted to personal jurisdiction in and a 
substantial nexus within those states, subjecting it to an obligation to collect 
sales tax therein.69  National also conducted a mail-order business in several 
other states, including Illinois, but contact with customers in those states was 
limited to mailing catalogues to them.70  It appealed from a judgment of the 
Illinois Supreme Court that required it to calculate, collect, and remit use taxes 
to the Illinois Department of Revenue,71 citing the Commerce Clause and Due 
Process Clause.72  The Court noted that in some instances a state may require a 
remote vendor to collect and remit a use tax, but nevertheless reversed the 
lower court, stating that it “has never held that a State may impose the duty of 
use tax collection and payment upon a seller whose only connection with 
customers in the State is by common carrier or the United States mail.”73  In its 
decision, the Court held that actual physical presence in a state is necessary 
under both Due Process and the Commerce Clauses before that state can force 
the collection of a use tax.74 
The Court in Quill v. North Dakota limited its physical presence test, as it 
applied to due process, distinguishing between the requirements of the two 
clauses.75  Quill was registered in Delaware with offices and warehouses in 
Illinois, California, and Georgia.76  Again, it was undisputed that Quill could 
be required to collect and remit use taxes for sales to consumers in those states.  
Although Quill did not own property in North Dakota and none of his 
 
 66. 386 U.S. 753 (1967). 
 67. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).  
 68. Nat’l Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 753–54. 
 69. See id. at 756; see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. and 
Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a 
defendant to a judgment in personam . . . he have certain minimum contacts” with the taxing state 
to satisfy “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”). 
 70. Nat’l Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 754. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. at 756. 
 73. Id. at 758. 
 74. See id. at 758–60.  The Court reversed the Illinois judgment, emphasizing the “sharp 
distinction” between a remote vendor with a physical presence in a taxing state and a vendor 
without physical presence.  Id.  But see Michael T. Fatale, State Tax Jurisdiction and the Mythical 
“Physical Presence” Constitutional Standard, 54 TAX LAW. 105, 107 (2000) (arguing that 
physical presence is not a necessary precondition for the assertion of state tax nexus). 
 75. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992) (stating that the clauses reflect 
“different constitutional concerns”). 
 76. Id. at 302. 
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employees worked in that state, he did sell office equipment and supplies 
there.77  Quill was forced to collect use tax on North Dakota sales by a state tax 
law conferring personal jurisdiction on “every person who engages in regular 
or systematic solicitation of a consumer market in th[e] state.”78 
The Court found that the state tax law was an undue burden on interstate 
commerce, stressing that the Due Process and Commerce Clauses have 
different purposes and policies.79  The Court stated that “[d]espite the 
similarity in phrasing, the nexus requirements of the Due Process and 
Commerce Clauses are not identical.”80  The Due Process Clause “concerns the 
fundamental fairness of governmental activity.”81  The nexus requirement 
under due process requires an individual’s connections to be “substantial 
enough to legitimate the State’s exercise of power over him.”82  The Court 
made it clear that the Due Process Clause was not an impediment to the 
collection of use tax under the facts in Quill, thereby allowing a state to impose 
a duty to collect use taxes on a vendor that continually and broadly solicits 
business with a state.83  This test departs from the requirement of physical 
presence set forth in National and instead focuses on a minimum contacts 
analysis.84 
Despite meeting the minimum contacts requirement of due process, to pass 
constitutional muster the tax must also be valid under the Commerce Clause.85  
The negative sweep of the Commerce Clause prevents states from unduly 
burdening interstate commerce.  The Court explained that there is no undue 
burden in imposing a requirement to collect use tax on a vendor that has a 
substantial nexus with the taxing state.86  The Court clarified that it is possible 
to “have the ‘minimum contacts’ with a taxing State as required by the Due 
Process Clause, and yet lack the ‘substantial nexus’ with that State as required 
by the Commerce Clause.”87 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 302–03 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-07(6) (1987)). 
 79. See id. at 305. 
 80. Quill, 504 U.S. at 312. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See id. at 313; see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. and 
Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) (“‘Presence’ in the state . . . has never been doubted when 
the activities of the corporation there have . . . been continuous and systematic . . . .”). 
 84. Quill, 504 U.S. at 313; see Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 
 85. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 312–13.  In recognizing the difference between the Due Process 
and Commerce Clauses the Court stated that “[t]he two standards are animated by different 
constitutional concerns and policies.”  Id. at 312. 
 86. Id. at 313 (“[T]he ‘substantial nexus’ requirement is not, like due process’[s] ‘minimum 
contacts’ requirement, a proxy for notice, but rather a means for limiting state burdens on 
interstate commerce.”). 
 87. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
902 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:893 
In Quill, the Court reaffirmed that a substantial nexus is not present when a 
vendor’s “only connection with customers in the State is by common carrier” 
or advertising.88  Although the Quill Court broke away from the physical 
presence test in analyzing the Due Process Clause, the substantial nexus 
threshold has continued to be interpreted to require a physical presence in the 
taxing state to satisfy the Commerce Clause.89 
The physical presence required to achieve substantial nexus with the taxing 
state is inevitably an impediment on states attempting to force out-of-state 
mail-order vendors to collect use tax.  The substantial nexus test is also 
implicated by analogy to remote vendors who solicit business in other states 
largely through the Internet.90  E-tailers can rely on the logic of Quill as a safe 
harbor, protecting remote vendors from the burden of collecting and remitting 
use taxes.91  The states have lamented the Supreme Court’s decisions in the 
area of remote taxation because of the tax leakage they have caused in relation 
to mail-order vendors.92  The opposition to the Court’s decisions has steadily 
grown as Internet vendors have utilized this safe harbor, thereby costing the 
states increasingly more revenue as the Internet grows in popularity.93  
Resistance to the physical presence requirement has also become more 
contentious, as major retailers have found ways to exploit the substantial nexus 
test, thereby receiving the many benefits of ubiquitous Internet commerce 
while avoiding use tax collections in all but one state.94  As an example, Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. has a physical storefront presence in every state, but its online 
subsidiary is only physically present in nine states.95  Since the courts 
historically respect formal legal organization, this allows the online subsidiary 
to avoid collecting use taxes in all states except nine, despite the storefront 
physical presence in every state.96 
 
 88. Id. at 301 (quoting Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 758 
(1967)). 
 89. Id. at 317–18. 
 90. See Klima, supra note 7, at ¶ 8 (stating that although “there is no direct implication from 
mail-order to e-retailers, most Internet companies assume that the Quill decision applies to them 
because the two industries share the defining characteristic of an ability to sell in many places 
without maintaining a physical presence”). 
 91. See Swartz, supra note 6, at 146. 
 92. See McLure, supra note 46, at 495–96. 
 93. See Morris, supra note 21, at 1403 (describing that although states begrudgingly 
accepted the physical presence test for mail-order sales, they have become “far more vocal” as the 
Internet has grown in popularity). 
 94. See Swartz, supra note 6, at 143. 
 95. Brian Krebs & Jonathan Krim, Big Stores to Charge Sales Taxes Online, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 7, 2003, at A01; see Swartz, supra note 6, at 143 n.11. 
 96. See Nathaniel T. Trelease & Andrew W. Swain, Nexus and Remote Sellers: The 
Taxation of Electronic Commerce, COLO. LAW., Feb. 2002, at 75, 77–78 (2002); see also Snyder, 
supra note 26, at 69 (noting that although not legally obligated, some retailers, including Wal-
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V.  POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
In Quill, the Court essentially invited congressional action in the area of 
Internet sales taxation.97  By separating the physical presence test from the Due 
Process Clause and substituting a minimum contacts analysis, the Court 
seemingly opened the door for Congress to act.98  This results because 
Congress may pass legislation, under its plenary power, authorizing states to 
burden interstate commerce without violating the Commerce Clause; however, 
Congress does not have this power with respect to the Due Process Clause.99  
The Court, in removing the barrier of the Due Process Clause and recognizing 
Congress’s broad authority under the Commerce Clause, stated, “No matter 
how we evaluate the burdens that use taxes impose on interstate commerce, 
Congress remains free to disagree with our conclusions. . . . Congress is now 
free to decide whether, when, and to what extent the States may burden 
interstate mail-order concerns with a duty to collect use taxes.”100  Thus it is 
clear that Congress has the power to eliminate the physical presence required 
to achieve substantial nexus and substitute another, less onerous, measure of 
nexus.101  To date, Congress has ignored the invitation.  As pressure continues 
to build from states and traditional brick-and-mortar vendors, Congress should 
act decisively to put all vendors on equal footing.  The actions taken to date 
have probably only contributed to the growing problem of use tax leakage. 
 
Mart Stores, Inc. have “voluntarily begun collecting sales and use taxes on online purchases, 
including purchases made by customers in states where the retailer does not have a physical 
presence”).  Those supporting e-tailers’ freedom from collecting use taxes have argued that the 
“voluntary” collection by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and other major retailers was done not to support 
the states’ right to collect use taxes on out-of-state vendors.  Rather, they argue it was done 
because the retailers wanted customers to be able to return merchandise purchased online to 
physical storefronts, and this interaction between the separate entities would forfeit the autonomy 
between the online subsidiary and physical storefront obligating the merchandiser to collect use 
taxes under current law.  See Krebs & Krim, supra note 95.  Therefore, the merchandisers receive 
favorable coverage in the press for what they would be obligated to do anyway.  See id. (“‘This is 
a well-timed PR stunt,’ said H. Robert Wientzen, chief executive of the Direct Marketers 
Association.  Wietzen said the retailers that agreed to collect sales tax have stores in most states—
which means they should be collecting taxes on online sales anyway—and they are major 
corporations that have the computer resources to handle the nation’s many tax rates.”). 
 97. 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992). 
 98. See id. at 312 (“Despite the similarity in phrasing, the nexus requirements of the Due 
Process and Commerce Clauses are not identical.”). 
 99. Id. at 305 (“While Congress has plenary power to regulate commerce among the States 
and thus may authorize state actions that burden interstate commerce . . . it does not similarly . . . 
have the power to authorize violations of the Due Process Clause.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 100. Id. at 318. 
 101. See id.  See generally Trelease & Swain, supra note 96, at 76–78 (suggesting several 
alternatives to the physical presence test to establish substantial nexus with the taxing state). 
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A. New Economy Tax Fairness Act 
A bill proposed in the 107th Congress, the New Economy Tax Fairness 
Act (Net Fair Act),102 sought to codify the judicially created framework in 
Quill rather than introduce a separate solution.  The Net Fair Act lists potential 
business activities that are not individually, nor in conjunction with other listed 
activities, sufficient to establish a physical presence in the buyer’s state.103  
Therefore, participation in any of the listed activities alone would provide an 
explicit safe harbor within which remote vendors could not be forced to collect 
and remit use taxes.  The provision most germane to the topic of taxation of 
Internet commerce is one providing that a buyer’s mere access to a remote 
vendor’s Web site does not create a physical presence within that state.104  Not 
surprisingly, the Net Fair Act has been strongly endorsed by e-retailers as a 
potential solution, but strong opposition by states and traditional retailers has 
prevented this alternative from receiving serious attention.105 
B. Internet Tax Freedom Act of 1998 
Congress’ first regulation of Internet taxation delayed finding a permanent 
solution to the problem.  In 1998 Congress enacted the Internet Tax Freedom 
Act (ITFA), which created a three-year moratorium on Internet taxes.106  
During this three-year period, states were precluded from imposing new taxes 
on Internet access charges and from imposing discriminatory taxes on Internet 
 
 102. S. 664, 107th Cong. (2001). 
 103. Id. § 101(a).  Among the activities listed that will not establish nexus with a buyer’s state 
are: 
  (1) The solicitation of orders or contracts by such person or such person’s 
representative in such State for sales of tangible or intangible personal property or 
services, which orders or contracts are approved or rejected outside the State, and, if 
approved, are fulfilled by shipment or delivery of such property from a point outside the 
State or the performance of such services outside the State. 
  . . . . 
  (4) The use of the Internet to create or maintain a World Wide Web site accessible by 
persons in such State. 
  (5) The use of an Internet service provider, on-line service provider, internetwork 
communication service provider, or other Internet access service provider, or World Wide 
Web hosting services to maintain or take and process orders via a web page or site on a 
computer that is physically located in such State. 
  (6) The use of any service provider for transmission of communications, whether by 
cable, satellite, radio, telecommunications, or other similar system. 
Id. 
 104. Id. § 101(a)(4). 
 105. See Swartz, supra note 6, at 147–48. 
 106. Pub. L. No. 105-277, §1101(a), 112 Stat. 2681–719. 
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commerce.107  The ITFA did not forestall taxes on all Internet commerce, but 
rather prevented the creation of new taxes.108  States that already had a 
functioning tax on Internet access charges were not affected because of a 
“grandfather” clause.109  In addition, states could still force remote vendors to 
collect and remit use taxes, as long as the substantial nexus test of Quill is 
satisfied.110  The discriminatory prong of the moratorium prevented states from 
charging higher tax rates on Internet vendors than were charged to traditional 
brick-and-mortar vendors for the same products,111 thereby providing a 
legislative mandate benefiting e-commerce at the expense of traditional 
storefront commercial operations. 
The Internet growth that thrived under the ITFA prompted Congress to 
extend its protection for another two years.  In 2001, the Internet 
Nondiscrimination Act was passed, which secured the benefits of the ITFA 
moratorium through November 1, 2003.112  This date has passed without 
Congress taking further definitive action.113  Several proposals were 
considered by the 108th Congress, including a couple that would make the 
moratorium permanent,114 and one that would extend the moratorium through 
2008,115 but none were ultimately passed by both houses of Congress.  A 
primary reason for the failure to reach an agreement on the future of the ITFA 
before it expired was the inability to reach a consensus on the definition of 
“Internet access.”116  Members of Congress were fearful that the definition of 
“Internet access” would be broadened to encompass telecommunications 
services that provide access to the Internet.117  If this broad definition were to 
gain favor, other industries providing telecommunications services, such as 
cable and telephone, might also be exempt from state and local taxes.118  The 
 
 107. Id. (“No State or political subdivision thereof shall impose any of the following taxes 
during the period beginning on October 1, 1998, and ending three years after the date of the 
enactment of this Act . . . .”). 
 108. Id. § 1101(a)(1) (providing that no State or political subdivision shall impose any  . . . tax 
on Internet access, “unless such tax was generally imposed and actually enforced prior to October 
1, 1998 . . . .”). 
 109. Id. 
 110. See Swartz, supra note 6, at 146. 
 111. Internet Tax Freedom Act § 1104(2); Swartz, supra note 6, at 146. 
 112. Pub. L. No. 107-75, § 2, 115 Stat. 703 (2001). 
 113. See Snyder, supra note 26, at 67 (arguing that reinstating the moratorium with an 
expanded definition of Internet access “would represent an example of incrementalism serving 
special telecommunications lobbying concerns”). 
 114. See, e.g., Internet Tax Nondiscrimination Act, H.R. 49, 108th Cong. (2003) (permanent 
extension); Internet Tax Nondiscrimination Act, S. 150, 108th Cong. (2004) (four-year 
extension); Internet Tax Nondiscrimination Act, S. 52 108th Cong. (2003) (permanent extension). 
 115. Internet Growth and Freedom Act of 2003, H.R. 1481, 108th Cong. § 2. 
 116. Snyder, supra note 26, at 66. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
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inability to tax these giant industries would result in a further reduction of 
revenue for the states.119 
Throughout it all, the lack of congressional guidance has left states in the 
dark concerning their options to tax Internet commerce.  The policy behind the 
ITFA was to ensure the survival of Internet commerce while in its infancy.120  
Preventing onerous Internet access charges and discriminatory tax rates upon 
e-commerce vendors, the ITFA fostered a friendly environment for Internet 
commerce to blossom.121  The goal of this policy has been met, perhaps too 
well, and now traditional retailers need to be protected.  The phenomenal 
growth projections of Internet commerce122 reveal that there is no further need 
for an Internet taxing moratorium, and the ITFA should not be extended. 
In hindsight, the ITFA may be best remembered for its creation of the 
Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce (ACEC).123  The ACEC was 
established in 1998 for the purpose of studying the effects of taxation on 
interstate e-commerce.124  The ACEC’s specific charge was to research state 
and local government efforts to collect sales and use taxes from remote 
vendors.125  The ACEC was composed of individuals with varied backgrounds 
from diverse industries, in order to represent all sides of the Internet taxing 
question.126  The nineteen members include three from the federal government, 
eight from state and local governments, and eight from the e-commerce 
industry, including small business, telecommunications carriers, local retail 
businesses, and consumer groups.127  Although the ACEC failed to garner the 
required two-thirds vote on issues pertaining to sales and use taxes (the vote 
required to become a formal legislative recommendation),128 the ACEC did 
propose that the states collaborate to simplify sales and use tax compliance.129  
Simplification has since become the focus of the most recent effort to reach a 
solution to the problem of taxing Internet sales transactions. 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. See Klima, supra note 7, at ¶ 11. 
 121. See Snyder, supra note 26, at 66. 
 122. Cf. GLENN J. MCLOUGHLIN, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: AN INTRODUCTION 1 (2002), 
available at http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/trade/ecomm/rs20426.pdf (“The rate of e-
commerce growth continues so rapidly that projections often are outdated as fast as they are 
published.”). 
 123. Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1102(a), 112 Stat. 2681–722 (1998). 
 124. Id. § 1102(g)(2)(E). 
 125. Id. 
 126. See id. § 1102(b)(1). 
 127. Id. § 1102(a)(1), (b)(1). 
 128. Internet Tax Freedom Act § 1103. 
 129. See ADVISORY COMMISSION ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, supra note 25, at 19–20.  
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C. Streamlined Sales Tax Project 
1. Implementation and Organization 
The Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Project (SSTP) is the most 
comprehensive and widely supported attempt to overhaul the current sales and 
use tax system.  It was initiated in March 2000 by a group of states and was 
sponsored by the National Governors Association (NGA), the National 
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), the Federation of Tax 
Administrators and the Multistate Tax Commission.130  Recognizing the 
obstacles present in requiring out-of-state vendors to collect sales tax, the 
SSTP focuses on simplifying the current system and relies on a voluntary 
agreement among the states to collect and remit sales tax to the taxing state.131  
A voluntary agreement, similar to the Uniform Commercial Code, is the states’ 
only option, because they lack an institutionalized forum in which to make 
binding multilateral decisions.132  The NGA, NCSL, Federation of Tax 
Administrators, and Multistate Tax Commission have no independent 
legislative authority.133  Therefore, they can only recommend uniform policies 
to state legislatures who must independently decide whether or not to accept 
them.134 
Currently more than forty states have become Streamlined Sales Tax 
Implementing States (member states).135  The SSTP issued its initial report (the 
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement) (SSUTA)136 to both the NGA and 
the NCSL.137  The NGA adopted the proposed legislation, while the NCSL 
modified the initial report and issued a unique version.138  Despite this 
perceived disagreement, the NGA issued a statement that “[t]here is only one 
state and local sales and use tax simplification effort underway among the 
 
 130. John A. Swain, State Sales and Use Tax Jurisdiction: An Economic Nexus Standard for 
the Twenty-first Century, 38 GA. L. REV. 343, 371 (2003). 
 131. See Swartz, supra note 6, at 148 (stating that SSTP implementation is a two-step process 
consisting of passing enabling legislation and enacting uniform laws as part of the tax code).   
 132. McLure, supra note 46, at 498; see also Sununu, supra note 23, at 336 (“No state would 
forego participation in a compact when all other states are forcing businesses to collect taxes from 
its own citizens for use by outside governments.”). 
 133. McLure, supra note 46, at 498. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Structure and Operating Rules: Streamlined Sales Tax Project, 
http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/participatingstates.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2005) 
[hereinafter SSTP Structure]. 
 136. Streamlined Sales Tax Project, Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (Adopted 
Nov. 12, 2002, as amended Apr. 16, 2005) [hereinafter SSUTA], www.streamlinedsalestax.org/ 
agreement.htm. 
 137. Taxware Resources, Streamlined Sales Tax Project, available at 
http://www.taxware.com/taxware_resources/sstp_1.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2005). 
 138. Id. 
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states, and there should continue to be only a single simplification effort.”139  
To further emphasize the cohesive nature of the SSTP, membership was 
extended to all states that enacted legislation based on either the SSTP or 
NCSL version of the tax simplification acts or a hybrid of the two proposals.140  
The member states adopted the original Streamlined Sales and Use Tax 
Agreement on November 12, 2002.141  The agreement becomes effective when 
“at least ten states comprising twenty percent of the total population . . . of all 
states imposing a sales tax have petitioned for membership and have been 
found to be in compliance with the [SSTP].”142  To date, states comprising in 
excess of twenty percent of the total population of states imposing a sales tax 
have enacted legislation aimed at bringing these states into compliance with 
the SSTP, but the required number of states needed to petition for membership 
has not been met.143 
The stated purpose of the SSTP is “to simplify and modernize sales and 
use tax administration in the member states in order to substantially reduce the 
burden of tax compliance.”144  As mentioned, there are currently more than 
7,600 state and local tax codes that vary depending on jurisdiction.145  Forcing 
an out-of-state vendor to collect and remit use taxes could potentially require a 
working knowledge of each state and local tax code.146  The Quill Court 
considered the cost of this administrative burden when it held that a substantial 
nexus was required to force tax collection on a remote vendor and to satisfy the 
Commerce Clause.147  Without this nexus protection, a start-up e-tailer would 
be forced to comply with every state and local tax code represented by a 
purchaser.148  This cost alone would deter many businesses and slow the 
 
 139. National Governors Association, Letter to State Officials (May 4, 2001), 
http://www.nga.org/portal/site/nga (enter “May 4, 2001” into search box and follow May 4, 2001 
– Letter – Streamlined Sales Tax Project hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 16, 2005). 
 140. Id. (“The work of the SSTP and the NCSL are complementary and differ only in the 
degree of simplification considered achievable in the short term . . . . Each state that passes 
legislation . . . committing to development and implementation of a streamlined sales tax system 
should recognize all other states passing such legislation as equal partners . . . regardless of 
whether the measure enacted is based on the SSTP or NCSL versions or is some hybrid of the 
two.”). 
 141. See SSUTA, supra note 136. 
 142. Id. § 701; Swain, supra note 130, at 371–72. 
 143. Swain, supra note 130, at 372. 
 144. SSUTA, supra note 136, § 102. 
 145. Swartz, supra note 6, at 144. 
 146. See id. at 148 (stating that if legislation is passed to overturn Quill, it will force retailers 
to “comply with thousands of different tax codes”). 
 147. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 303 (1992) (noting that the North Dakota 
Supreme Court based its decision partly on the “‘welter of complicated obligations’ imposed by 
state and local taxing authorities”). 
 148. See Swartz, supra note 6, at 149. 
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growth of e-commerce.149  Until now, this threat was discharged by the 
protection of Quill and the ITFA.  Instead of leveling the playing field, 
however, the advantage has been shifted to e-tailers.  By “simplify[ing] and 
moderniz[ing] sales and use tax administration” the SSTP seeks to eliminate 
the burden of compliance costs and treat all sellers equally.150  Among the key 
areas that the SSTP includes as part of its simplification effort are uniform 
definitions of tax bases, fewer tax rates, uniform sourcing rules, less complex 
tax returns and remittances, and the use of new technological data capturing 
models.151 
a. Tax Bases 
Legislatures from each state control what is taxable or exempt from taxes 
in their state.152  Members of the SSTP, however, agree to use common 
definitions in their tax laws.153  Until the end of 2005, local jurisdictions within 
member states were allowed to have a different tax base than that state as long 
as it was uniform within those jurisdictions.154  At the end of that time period, 
the tax base for all localities and the state tax base were required to be 
identical.155 
This agreement is an important simplification from the patchwork of 
municipal and state rates currently in force, and will require that remote 
vendors be familiar with only one tax base per state.  A few exceptions exist to 
 
 149. Id.; see also Christopher J. Schafer, Federal Legislation Regarding Taxation of Internet 
Sales Transactions, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 415, 420–22 (2001) (discussing the differences 
between mail-order and electronic commerce that render “the physical presence standard 
inapplicable to e-commerce”). 
 150. SSUTA, supra note 136, § 102; see McLure, supra note 46, at 491 (arguing that extant 
sales and use taxes deviate from an ideal sales tax in part because they do not “apply equally to all 
sales to consumers”). 
 151. SSUTA, supra note 136, § 102.  Specifically the SSUTA lists ten areas of focus: 
A. State level administration of sales and use tax collections. 
B. Uniformity in the state and local tax bases. 
C. Uniformity of major tax base definitions. 
D. Central, electronic registration system for all member states. 
E. Simplification of state and local tax rates. 
F. Uniform sourcing rules for all taxable transactions. 
G. Simplified administration of exemptions. 
H. Simplified tax returns. 
I. Simplification of tax remittances. 
J. Protection of consumer privacy. 
Id. 
 152. See McLure, supra note 46, at 503. 
 153. See SSUTA, supra note 136, § 327. 
 154. Id. § 302. 
 155. Id. 
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the requirement that the bases be identical.156  These apply to products that are 
separately registered in the state, such as motor vehicles and mobile homes, 
which do not contribute to the current Internet taxing dilemma.157 
The move toward tax base simplification comes at an important time in 
technological development.158  A tax exemption on transactions from a 
nonprofit business, intangible products, services, or purchases by a business 
that are to be resold to the consumer represents decisions based on well-
established tax policy; however, new products are being developed that 
challenge traditional notions of what is “tangible” and whether a transaction 
represents a service (that would be tax exempt) or a product (that is fully 
taxable).159  Digital products are at the forefront of this new type of consumer 
good.160  Without a common definition that mandates uniform tax treatment for 
these new products, they are likely to receive disparate treatment.161  Similarly 
situated consumers may then be able to receive virtually the same benefits, but 
be subject to different tax consequences.162  For instance, a consumer who 
purchases an audio compact disc at a “Main Street” store will pay sales tax for 
this tangible good whereas a consumer who downloads the same compact disc 
in Mp3 format may escape taxation entirely because the product may be 
considered intangible.163  As consumers increasingly gain access to new 
products available through the Internet, this problem will only be exacerbated.  
The SSTP common tax base would resolve this problem by treating like 
products equally.164  Under the SSUTA a remote Internet vendor would be able 
to refer to a library of definitions to determine the correct tax that should be 
collected—an amount that would likely be defined equally to the product 
available on Main Street.165 
 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See McLure, supra note 46, at 491–92 (arguing that current sales and use taxes deviate 
from an ideal sales tax in part because they distort consumer purchasing behavior). 
 159. See generally id. at 491 (discussing the four criteria for an ideal sales tax: “(1) sales to 
business, including sales of capital goods, should not be taxed; (2) taxes should apply equally to 
all sales to consumers; (3) taxes should apply equally to sales made by local merchants and 
remote vendors; and (4) taxation should be as simple as possible, consistent with other 
objectives”). 
 160. Id. at 491–92. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See McLure, supra note 46, at 491–92.  This is in addition to the inequity that may result 
from the imposition of sales tax on the Main Street purchaser and the absence of sales tax charged 
to the Internet consumer where substantial nexus is absent. 
 164. See SSUTA, supra note 136, § 327.  The SSUTA’s uniform sourcing rules explicitly 
state that sellers shall source sales in accordance with its provisions “regardless of the 
characterization of a product as tangible personal property, a digital good, or a service.”  Id. § 
309. 
 165. See id. § 327. 
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It is important to note that tax base uniformity is required only within a 
state, and not among different states.166  Although this appears to contradict the 
policy of simplification, in reality its effect is minimized because the SSUTA 
contains a library of uniform product definitions.167  If a term in the library is 
used in a member state’s sales or use tax statutes, that state must adopt the 
common definition.168  As the collection of definitions in the library continues 
to grow, tax bases will become more uniform.169  In effect then, uniformity is 
achieved while autonomy is retained by the member states. 
b. Tax Rate Simplification 
The SSUTA requires that by the end of 2005 all member states use only 
one state tax rate.170  Also, local jurisdictions that impose sales and use taxes 
must use a single common rate.171  Exceptions that are currently used, such as 
lower tax rates on food and drugs, will continue to be allowed, as are different 
rates on property individually registered with the state.172  Lower rates on food 
and drugs reflect a social policy of allowing consumers easier access to these 
vital products, and do not threaten the integrity of the SSTP.173 
c. Uniform Sourcing Rules 
The SSUTA establishes uniform sourcing rules that shift the burden of 
accurately determining and remitting transaction taxes from the remote seller 
to the states.174  In general, the SSUTA includes an agreement that the states 
will source retail sales of a product according to a hierarchy of rules.175  In a 
typical over-the-counter sale, the destination of the sale is obvious: it is the site 
of the business location.176  In a remote sales transaction, however, the source 
 
 166. Swain, supra note 130, at 373. 
 167. SSUTA, supra note 136, app. C, pt. II. 
 168. Id. § 327. 
 169. Id. § 328; see Swain, supra note 130, at 374 (noting that “[i]t is expected that the library 
of definitions will continue to expand to cover nearly all possible products, in effect reducing the 
sales and use tax code of each state to a taxability matrix”). 
 170. SSUTA, supra note 136, § 308(A). 
 171. Id. § 308(B). 
 172. Id. § 308(A). 
 173. Sununu, supra note 23, at 327 (highlighting that exemptions for food and medicine, 
which compose a higher percentage of total consumption for the poor, limit the regressive nature 
of sales taxes). 
 174. SSUTA, supra note 136, § 301. 
 175. Id. § 310. 
 176. Id. § 310(A)(1); see Swain, supra note 130, at 375–76 (contrasting the ease at which 
over-the-counter sellers can comply with existing sales tax laws with the difficulty remote 
vendors have with complying with the same laws). 
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of the sale is not always apparent.177  Because the seller and vendor do not 
physically meet at the time of the sale, the source could be the location of the 
vendor, the purchaser’s residence or business, or some third-party address 
where the product is delivered.  In the absence of the SSTP, each of these 
options may have a different local and state tax rate.178  This ambiguity causes 
administrative nightmares for remote vendors and may make the cost of doing 
business unreasonably high.  Under the SSUTA, the states bear this burden by 
providing accurate sourcing information on which sellers rely.179  In addition, 
sellers that rely in good faith on the state-provided lists are immune from 
liability for any errors.180 
Under the SSUTA the sourcing objective is to approximate destination-
based taxation.181  Therefore, in a remote purchase situation, the sale is sourced 
to the location where the purchaser receives the product.182  The destination is 
based on five- and nine-digit ZIP codes, which solves the problem of matching 
the taxing jurisdiction to the address.183 
d. Tax Returns and Remittances 
Each member state must provide administration of its sales and use taxes 
on a state level, thereby obligating remote vendors to register and 
communicate with only one agency in each state.184  This substantially 
mitigates the previous burden of corresponding with numerous local taxing 
jurisdictions, each with disparate taxing regulations and procedures, within 
each state.  In addition, a vendor only must remit one annual tax return rather 
than returns submitted quarterly as before.185  Once vendors remit the proper 
tax returns and tax receipts to the state, the burden is on the state to correctly 
distribute the taxes to the local taxing jurisdictions.186 
Remote vendors will also benefit from the SSTP’s provisions on the 
required notice due on a change of tax rates.187  States are free to adjust sales or 
tax rates, but must comply with several requirements aimed at reducing 
 
 177. See Swain, supra note 130, at 375–76 (arguing that from the perspective of remote 
vendors, the SSTA sourcing rules may be the most important reform). 
 178. See id. at 376. 
 179. SSUTA, supra note 136, § 305. 
 180. Id. § 306. 
 181. See id. § 310; Swain, supra note 130, at 376 n.167 (arguing that sound tax policy 
requires destination sourcing and stating that: “[b]ecause the sales tax is a consumption tax, the 
jurisdiction in which the consumption occurs [theoretically the location of the purchaser] should 
be the beneficiary of the tax”). 
 182. SSUTA, supra note 136, § 310(A)(2). 
 183. See id. § 305(F). 
 184. Id. § 301. 
 185. Id. § 318(A). 
 186. Id. § 301. 
 187. SSUTA, supra note 136, § 304. 
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vendors’ administrative burdens, including, providing sellers with as much 
advance notice as possible and limiting the effective date of a change to the 
first day of a new calendar quarter.188 
e. Technology 
All of the best-laid plans of the SSTP would be unworkable without the aid 
of new technology.189  Three potential models have been developed for 
retailers to use in communicating with states and calculating the proper 
transaction tax that should be collected and remitted.190  The states have again 
agreed to assume responsibility for funding a portion of the technology 
models.  The first model, “Certified Service Provider,”191 performs all of the 
vendor’s sales and use tax functions.192  The second model, “Certified 
Automated System,”193 serves a tax calculation function, leaving the vendor 
with the obligation of remitting the proper tax.194  The third option for a vendor 
is to develop its own proprietary system that would need to pass a certification 
test.195  This option is available only to those vendors who have sales in at least 
five states and a total annual revenue of five hundred million dollars.196 
The changes envisioned by the SSTP clearly represent a significant 
investment of time and money by the states.  States are likely willing to 
shoulder these costs because they believe the expensive administrative 
procedures involved in coordinating tax bases, rates, financial information, and 
new technological systems will be offset by the increased revenues generated 
by plugging the leaks from lost use taxes.197  In addition, because the Court in 
Quill based its Commerce Clause physical presence requirement on the undue 
burden use tax collection would cause remote vendors,198 it is hoped that 
 
 188. Id. 
 189. See Snyder, supra note 26, at 68 (noting that the success of the SSTP is largely 
dependent on the implementation of new technology). 
 190. See SSUTA, supra note 136, §§ 202–07. 
 191. A Certified Service Provider is defined as “[a]n agent certified under the Agreement to 
perform all the seller’s sales and use tax functions, other than the seller’s obligation to remit tax 
on its own purchases.”  Id. § 203. 
 192. Id. § 205. 
 193. A Certified Automated System is defined as “[s]oftware certified under the Agreement 
to calculate the tax imposed by each jurisdiction on a transaction, determine the amount of tax to 
remit to the appropriate state, and maintain a record of the transaction.”  Id. § 202. 
 194. Id. § 206. 
 195. SSUTA, supra note 136, § 207. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Cf. Swain, supra note 130, at 379 (“Membership in SSUTA is a win-win for most states, 
streamlining tax administration and laying the groundwork for expanded sales and use tax 
nexus.”). 
 198. But see id. at 367 (“[S]ome have argued that Quill did not so much create a physical 
presence test as it did create two safe harbors: one for tax collector-physical presence, and one for 
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implementation of the SSUTA simplifications would cause the Court to 
abandon its physical presence requirement in favor of a nexus test that is easier 
to meet.199  If this fails, the SSTP would still succeed if Congress accepted 
Quill’s invitation to regulate in the area of interstate commerce and 
legislatively established a nexus threshold that treats all sellers equitably.200 
One such alternative to the physical presence standard that is gaining 
momentum is economic nexus.201  Economic nexus is defined without 
reference to a remote vendor’s physical presence.202  Instead, it would be 
triggered by a remote vendor’s delivery of goods to the taxing state.203  To 
prevent an undue administrative burden on a remote vendor with only limited 
sales in a taxing state, a de minimis floor would be established.204  If the 
vendor does not exceed this de minimis amount, no use tax obligation could be 
imposed upon the vendor.205  Congress should legislatively adopt a similar 
measure of economic nexus to eliminate the current disparity in Internet 
taxation and provide horizontal equity between consumers and sellers.206 
2. Arguments Against the SSTP 
Despite the strong support of the states and traditional retailers, the SSTP 
is not without its detractors.  As expected, the most outspoken critics of the 
proposed new system are remote vendors.207  They likely recognize that 
although the SSTP attempts to ease the burden of transaction tax compliance, 
administrative burdens are not the only costs imposed by requiring the 
collection of sales tax.  Chief among these costs is the forfeiture of the price 
 
the taxpayer-remote sales for which the only contact with the state is by mail or common 
carrier.”). 
 199. See id. at 366–69 (arguing that economic nexus should replace the physical presence test 
in determining whether a vendor has a substantial nexus with the taxing state).  Swain states that 
an economic nexus statute could be enacted that (a) immunizes remote sellers from past 
potential liabilities, (b) gives a reasonable time to prepare for the new nexus rule before it 
goes into effect, and (c) possibly even suspends application of the statute, if legally 
challenged, until a court of final jurisdiction rules on it constitutionality. 
Id. 
 200. See Masterson, supra note 8, at 209–25 (arguing that the nexus standard be modified to 
reflect the non-physical nature of e-commerce). 
 201. Id. at 213–14. 
 202. Id. at 214. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. See Masterson, supra note 8, at 214. 
 206.  Swain argues that the nexus issue is simply a balance between the burden on the seller 
and the benefit to the government.  Swain, supra note 130, at 355.  By lowering the compliance 
burden, a lower nexus threshold can be justified.  Id. 
 207. See Swain, supra note 130, at 379. 
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advantage remote vendors currently have over traditional retailers.208  For 
instance, if a typical sales tax rate is six percent, a remote vendor could match 
the price of a traditional retailer and earn six percent more profit.  
Alternatively, the remote vendor could undercut the retailer’s price by six 
percent while earning the same profit.  Either way, the remote vendor has a 
distinct competitive advantage.  Consumers who profit from this advantage (by 
failing to report the required use tax) have been less resistant to a potential 
change.209  This is likely due to a lack of knowledge of the taxing dilemma or a 
feeling that the taxing loophole was bound to end sometime anyway.210 
Colorado Gov. William F. Owens has taken up the fight on behalf of 
consumers and remote vendors.211  He has criticized the SSTP as a move 
toward big government that rises to the level of a new tax.212  Owens argues 
that the SSTP will increase complexity rather than reduce it, creating “the 
United Nations of state tax policy.”213  He contends that oversight and 
implementation of taxing decisions are being “ceded to and dictated by a board 
of un-elected and unaccountable out-of-state tax bureaucrats.”214 
Owens’ comments are off the mark.  Although the SSTP adds new 
technological challenges and requires cooperation among the states, these 
efforts will result in a reduction in complexity.  With uniform tax rates, bases 
and sourcing rules, among others, remote vendors will be able to comply with 
every state’s sales and use tax laws, whereas before this was administratively 
impossible.215  In addition, the SSTP may actually reduce levels of bureaucracy 
rather than resulting in a larger government.  It will be instrumental in 
eliminating local jurisdictional taxing levels that differ from the state level.216  
This simplification will reduce the need for additional layers of government 
whose primary purpose is to control the complex interaction between these 
government levels. 
Owens’ comments accusing the SSTP of being run by “unelected and 
unaccountable out-of-state tax bureaucrats”217 also need to be examined.  It is 
true that the majority of SSTP participants are state revenue department 
administrators; however, several representatives of state legislatures and local 
 
 208. See McLure, supra note 46, at 495 (noting that granting tax exemption to electronic 
commerce would give traditional retailers’ high-tech competitors an unfair advantage). 
 209. See Swain, supra note 130, at 379–80. 
 210. Id. (noting that “tax loopholes, like many things in life, are ‘good while they last’ but 
eventually come to an end”). 
 211. Colorado Gov. Owens Attacks SSTP, Says It Could Create New Tax Burden, 71 
U.S.L.WK. 2814 (2003) [hereinafter Owens]. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 2815. 
 214. Id. 
 215. See SSUTA, supra note 136, § 102. 
 216. See id. §§ 302, 308(A). 
 217. Owens, supra note 211, at 2815. 
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governments are also involved.218  Further, as nearly every state is now a part 
of the SSTP, there is little risk that tax decisions will be made by “out-of-state 
tax bureaucrats.”219  Owens also underestimates the importance of including 
unelected officials, such as national retailers, trade associations, manufacturers, 
technology companies and e-tailers, which have a unique perspective and a 
large stake in the SSTP. 
Owens presents two more arguments for his claim that new tax burdens on 
Internet purchases will “dampen enthusiasm for Internet usage and stifle 
technological innovation,” and that the SSTP would “disproportionately punish 
rural, disabled, or even elderly buyers who may find online transactions easier 
than traditional purchases at brick-and-mortar retailers.”220  Again, these 
criticisms are rebuttable.  First, there seems to be little threat of derailing 
Internet usage.  Internet sales growth continues at an exponential rate and has 
become the predominant way that many consumers purchase goods.221  This 
torrid growth rate is not likely the result of only a lifting of a sales tax burden.  
Rather, it springs from the convenience online shopping brings to consumers 
and the ability to purchase and compare goods that are normally not 
available.222  Requiring remote vendors to collect sales tax would affect 
Internet sales only negligibly, and would help level the playing field for 
traditional retailers.223 
Second, an argument that rural or disabled consumers would suffer more 
from an Internet tax is simply without basis.  This line of reasoning is 
irrelevant because the consumers to whom Gov. Owens refers are already 
legally obligated to remit these taxes in the form of a use tax.  Therefore, the 
implementation of an Internet tax does not affect the burden on these 
consumers.  Instead, it ensures compliance with existing tax laws.  Merely 
because another group of consumers can more readily access traditional 
retailers if the tax leakage is plugged does not create a heavier burden on 
consumers who rely on Internet purchases.  Consumers who visit a brick-and-
mortar store or shop online have the same total tax obligation, whether in the 
form of a sales tax or a use tax.224  In fact, if there is a difference, online 
consumers who pay a use tax currently benefit by delaying the payment of the 
tax until their individual tax return deadline, whereas sales tax is collected at 
the point and time of purchase. 
 
 218. See SSTP Structure, supra note 135. 
 219. Owens, supra note 211, at 2815. 
 220. Id. 
 221. See, e.g., Klima, supra note 7, at ¶ 13. 
 222. See Sununu, supra note 23, at 334. 
 223. E-fairness, Internet Tax Policy Myths and Facts, http://www.e-fairness.org (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2005) (stating that “[A] sales tax on Internet purchases ‘will not be a significant 
impediment to the growth of the online retail channel.’”). 
 224. See Klima, supra note 7, at ¶ 15. 
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Other, more valid arguments against the SSTP have also been posited.  
One takes a theoretical approach to counter proponents who justify the need 
for a current law change by citing changing technology.225  As the argument 
goes, changing laws to adapt to technology is most appropriate in situations 
where new technology offers a means to evade existing outdated laws.226  
Examples include modifying wiretap laws to conform with wireless cellular 
phones, or altering mail-fraud laws to deal with illegal acts committed through 
the Internet.227  This theoretical approach is predicated on the claim that remote 
Internet sales do not fit into this category because they are no different than 
traditional phone or mail-order sales and do not require a change in law.228 
The theoretical argument fails to consider the weight the Court gave to 
administrative burdens in National Bellas Hess and Quill.  Justice Stewart was 
concerned with how this type of burden would impact the Commerce Clause 
when he stated in National Bellas Hess that “[t]he many variations in rates of 
tax, in allowable exemptions, and in administrative and record-keeping 
requirements could entangle [a remote vendor] in a virtual welter of 
complicated obligations . . . .”229  Although it is true that remote sales via the 
Internet are analogous to mail-order or phone sales, the SSTP is not merely 
concerned with changing technologies, but also in shifting the compliance 
burden from the remote seller to the member states.230 
Another argument focuses on the potential negative economic effects that 
would accompany a departure from the substantial nexus test.  Its position is 
that if the physical presence requirement of the substantial nexus test is eroded, 
and remote vendors are required to collect and remit use taxes, only firms with 
an offshore location will receive the advantage of not having to collect 
transaction taxes.231  This contention assumes that courts will redefine the 
substantial nexus test into one based more heavily on economic nexus.232  As 
such, retailers may begin moving their operations outside the United States to 
continue to reap the avoidance advantage of having no sales tax obligation.233  
Ultimately, the relocation of businesses outside the United States along with 
 
 225. See Sununu, supra note 23, at 334–35. 
 226. Id. at 334. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 334–35. 
 229. 386 U.S. 753, 759–60 (1967). 
 230. See Swain, supra note 130, at 382–83 (noting that the SSTP’s simplification efforts will 
ease the compliance burden, but stating that the best way to end the physical presence test of 
Quill may be to expand the definition of nexus in response to SSTP reforms). 
 231. Sununu, supra note 23, at 336. 
 232. See Swartz, supra note 6, at 149 (arguing that “[a]n economic nexus analysis would 
justifiably capture remote sellers who reap millions of dollars in sales while dodging use tax 
collection and remittance duties”). 
 233. See Sununu supra note 23, at 336. 
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the accompanying relocation of product development and human capital would 
be detrimental to the economy. 
This viewpoint focuses on the potential plight of the economy through lost 
jobs and business, but fails to adequately consider the states’ current troubles 
resulting from a lack of sales tax revenue.  Admittedly, moving businesses 
overseas is not a desired outcome, but the same result—lost jobs—may be 
realized with the current rate of Internet sales growth and revenue loss due to 
use-tax leakage.  Thousands of state employees depend on state revenues 
derived from sales taxes to fund their wages.  As this tax base continues to 
erode through use tax leakage, jobs will also be lost, if only to a different 
fate—unemployment—rather than shifting bases of operation. 
D. Increased Efforts to Collect the Use Tax 
Although the SSTP is the most comprehensive proposal to address and 
rectify the loss in state tax revenue, its bold nature and dependence on a large 
number of states to comply with its mandate may slow its implementation.  In 
the interim period, states have other options available to plug use tax leakage.  
Focusing on the fact that the current Internet tax dilemma is not a product of 
inadequate law, but rather inadequate compliance with the law, states can take 
steps to more actively enforce use tax laws.234  The most obvious measure is to 
increase audits of taxpayers.235  By examining an individual’s spending 
behavior, the state taxing authority can determine whether purchases were 
made from a remote vendor that was not obligated to collect a sales tax.  An 
audit would be able to discover whether the consumer self-reported the 
corresponding use tax on his or her individual return.  This method, although 
effective, is extremely costly.236  The amount of use tax evasion per consumer 
is likely a negligible amount that would be outweighed by the cost of training 
and deploying taxing agents to investigate the number of consumers necessary 
to regain substantial revenue.237 
 
 234. See Klima, supra note 7, at ¶ 15 (noting that “[s]tates have two options . . . to stop the 
sales tax leakage: (1) stronger enforcement of use taxes, or (2) give e-retailers an incentive to 
voluntarily collect and remit sales taxes”).  The argument for inducing remote vendors to 
voluntarily collect and remit sales taxes usually involves the granting of amnesty to relieve 
remote vendors of a potential liability for back taxes, interest, and penalties for failing to collect 
and remit taxes that were required, but not paid.  See Nathaniel T. Trelease, Taxing Internet 
Sales: Bringing the Old Economy to the New Economy, COLO. LAW., Dec. 2003, at 11, 13–14 
(2003).  In addition, shareholder litigation may arise alleging that the vendor’s officers breached 
their duty of care by failing to correctly access the corporation’s tax liability.  Id. 
 235. Klima, supra note 7, at ¶ 16. 
 236. Swartz, supra note 6, at 144 (“[A] reliable and efficient auditing system simply would 
not be cost effective.”). 
 237. Hart, supra note 4, at 400–01 (stating that enforcement of use tax compliance “would be 
burdensome to the point of futility”). 
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More aggressive auditing would also be politically unwise and generate 
privacy concerns.238  In addition, the time needed to sift through old receipts or 
credit card statements to determine if the proper tax was collected is disruptive 
to consumers (and more importantly for public officials, disruptive to 
voters).239  Challenging the tax returns of a large number of state residents for a 
small dollar figure gain is not a practice consistent with long-term political 
success. 
A less direct method of determining consumer compliance is through 
information-sharing between states.240  For instance, a consumer who 
purchases furniture in Missouri and has it shipped to Illinois, where the vendor 
has no physical presence, may avoid paying Illinois sales tax.  However, if the 
Missouri business submitted the purchase information to Illinois taxing 
authorities, the amount of use tax due could be determined and checked on the 
individual’s return without an invasive audit.241  Of course, an audit would 
result if the tax were not voluntarily remitted.  This method again raises 
privacy concerns that businesses are sharing personal information about 
consumers.  It may also invoke a federalism challenge if an out-of-state 
business without nexus with the taxing state were forced to act.  Therefore, this 
type of information sharing may be restricted to a voluntary relationship.  
Authorities in Florida have reportedly found a way around this concern.242  
Florida police stop furniture trucks crossing the state border and examine the 
value of the goods and determine the purchaser.243  The state waits the 
appropriate amount of time for the tax to be remitted, and if the purchaser does 
not self-report the proper use tax, he or she is billed for the amount plus 
interest and penalty.244 
Another potential remedy focuses on evidence that much of the use tax 
leakage can be attributed to consumers who are unaware of their obligation.  
To combat consumer ignorance, a state advertising campaign should be used to 
educate consumers.245  Advertisements would likely be most effective at 
changing consumer behavior if they are posted on Internet vendors’ Web 
sites.246 
In conjunction with an advertising campaign, states could use their own tax 
forms to raise consumer awareness.247  Some states have experimented with 
 
 238. Klima, supra note 7, at ¶ 16; see Trelease, supra note 234, at 12. 
 239. See Trelease, supra note 234, at 12. 
 240. Klima, supra note 7, at ¶ 16. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
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 245. Klima, supra note 7, at ¶ 16. 
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 247. See id. 
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inserting a line on the front page of the individual tax form for use tax owed 
instead of providing the calculation in a separate schedule.248  The line on the 
front page could include a brief set of calculations that asks the taxpayer to list 
the amount of purchases made in the absence of sales tax, which would be 
multiplied by the state use tax rate.  In particular, Louisiana moved its use tax 
instructions to the front of its tax form and realized collections in a single year 
that were three times the amount received in the previous seven years.249 
Another method of making taxpayers aware of their use tax obligation is to 
include on the individual tax return form a default use tax amount, based on a 
percentage of income.  In this situation the taxpayer can no longer plead 
ignorance of the law.  If the taxpayer wishes to escape the use tax burden, he or 
she must deliberately change the default number to zero.  In addition to 
bringing the obligation to the taxpayer’s attention, this method makes it easier 
to prove that a taxpayer knowingly engaged in tax evasion rather than 
inadvertently overlooked the obligation. 
E. Sales Tax Deduction 
A new federal tax law may work together with other potential solutions to 
mollify objections that individual consumers have against being forced to pay 
transaction taxes on remote purchases.250  For the 2004 and 2005 tax years, 
income tax return filers had the option of deducting state and local income tax 
paid or the amount of state and local sales tax paid.251  The state and local sales 
taxes include compensating use taxes paid, thereby allowing consumers to 
deduct taxes withheld on remote Internet purchases.252  This deduction is really 
the resurrection of a former tax law that was eliminated in 1986.253  The former 
tax law did not make consumers choose, but rather allowed a deduction for 
both income tax payments and payments for state and local sales taxes.254  The 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 was a sweeping proposal with an aim at eliminating 
complexities that existed in a system with numerous itemized deductions.255  
The Tax Reform Act was written to eliminate all state and local tax deductions, 
 
 248. See id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–357, § 501, 118 Stat. 1418, 1520–
21. 
 251.  Id.; Internal Revenue Service, Optional State Sales Tax Tables, I.R.S. Publication 600 
(2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/publications/p600/index.html [hereinafter IRS Pub. 600] 
(last visited Nov. 4, 2005). 
 252. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 § 501; IRS Pub. 600, supra note 251. 
 253. Carole Keeton Strayhorn, Restoration of the IRS Sales Tax Deduction Should Be One of 
Texas’ Main Priorities in Congress, Mar. 2002, http://www.window.state.tx.us/specialrpt/ 
deduction04 [hereinafter Restoration of Sales Tax Deduction] (citing the passage of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085). 
 254. Id. 
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but in compromise negotiations the only deduction eliminated was that of state 
and local sales taxes.256 
One of the major objections to the elimination of a sales tax deduction was 
the inequity it caused to taxpayers.257  Currently forty-two states and the 
District of Columbia impose a state income tax.258  Residents of the eight states 
that remain are unable to take advantage of the deduction for income tax paid.  
The net effect of this geographic taxing disparity is that taxpayers in states 
without income tax pay more taxes to the federal government as a percentage 
of income than do residents of other states.259  Enter the American Jobs 
Creation Act of 2004.260  The majority of the American Jobs Creation Act is 
dedicated to business taxation; however, buried in the language is a 
congressional green light for consumers to deduct sales taxes on their federal 
returns.261  It is important to note that this deduction is available only to the 
approximately one-third of taxpayers who itemize deductions rather than 
taking the standard deduction.262 
As mentioned, the newest version of the sales tax deduction differs from 
the original in forcing taxpayers to make a choice between a sales tax or state 
income tax deduction.263  For citizens in states without an income tax, the 
choice is obvious.  The sales tax deduction is a boon to citizens of these states 
who will always be better off with the sales tax deduction.264  For citizens of 
the other states, a comparison must be made.265  To lighten the record-keeping 
burden on consumers, the U.S. Treasury has developed “State Sales Tax 
Tables.”266  The tables eliminate the need for consumers to retain receipts for 
every purchase made throughout the year, which would then be aggregated to 
determine sales taxes paid.267  They are based on the average consumption by 
taxpayers, filing status, number of dependents, the amount of income earned 
and the state income tax rates.268  Therefore, taxpayers in states with high 
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levels of income tax will receive higher deductions than taxpayers in lower-
taxed states.269  Similarly, the deduction increases as family size and total 
income rises, recognizing that as family size and income increases so do 
purchases and ultimately sales taxes paid.270 
Consumers are not forced to rely on the deduction given in the table.  They 
are free to save receipts and deduct the actual amount paid.271  While this 
alternative will not be appealing to most taxpayers, an add-on provision to the 
tax tables will lead many consumers to deduct sales taxes rather than income 
taxes.  The provision allows taxpayers to supplement the deductible amount 
given in the table by sales taxes paid on certain specified items, and it is also 
available to consumers who elect to take the standard deduction.272  These 
items include most types of automobiles, aircrafts, boats, homes, and home 
building materials.273  The sales tax paid on a car or on a new home can be 
substantial, and in 2004 and 2005, deductible.  This allowance will go a long 
way in reducing consumer resistance to paying sales tax on large dollar-figure 
items such as purchases of home building materials that are purchased over the 
Internet from a remote vendor.  The potential for increased consumer demand 
due to the deductibility of the sales tax will also help persuade remote vendors 
to collect sales taxes in the absence of a physical presence in the taxing state. 
In certain instances the benefits of a sales tax deduction may be limited.  
For instance, if the sales tax rate charged is greater than the general state sales 
tax rate, the deduction will be limited to the general sales tax rate.274  This may 
occur in states that assess a higher tax rate on some items, such as motor 
vehicles.275  Situations also arise where the sales tax rate is lower than the 
general level.  This is commonly found with food, clothing, and medical 
supplies.276  If a sales tax is charged that is lower than the general rate, the 
deduction will be limited to the amount paid.277  Variations in sales tax rates 
within a state would be less frequent if the uniform provisions of the SSUTA 
applied. 
The effect of this new tax change and the number of consumers who will 
take advantage of it is currently unknown.  What is clear is that this deduction 
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alone is not enough to change the course of the Internet taxing debate, although 
it should help pacify the individual consumer.  Remote vendors and businesses 
purchasing supplies from these vendors will remain largely unaffected.  While 
it is true that remote vendors should benefit from a degree of customer 
goodwill because of the knowledge that sales taxes would be deductible, the 
purchase of most routine items will not be large enough to justify the 
administrative cost of retaining each individual receipt.  Therefore, most 
consumers will rely on the provided tax tables without recognizing a benefit 
from each additional purchase.  Business purchases will likewise remain 
unaffected.  In most cases, purchases for resale are sales tax exempt, bringing 
these purchases outside of the deduction, while other purchases for use in a 
business are not deductible.278 
Both states with and without a sales tax in place should support this 
measure.  A federal sales tax deduction acts as a federal subsidy to the states.  
The Congressional Budget Office has estimated the annual tax cost of a sales 
tax deduction at $2.0 billion.279  This money is certainly not given to the states 
outright, but it may allow states to directly increase sales tax rates with fewer 
objections from their citizens.  Alternatively, states may be able to lower state 
income taxes, thereby galvanizing citizen support, while simultaneously 
increasing sales tax rates enough to cover the loss from the reduction of 
income taxes and provide a net increase in revenues.  Consumers would be 
willing to accept this trade off as long as the total amount of tax expense does 
not increase.  This is made possible through the federal government-funded 
sales and use tax deduction. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The problem created by use tax leakage cannot be ignored any longer.  The 
majority ofstates understand the growing financial crisis created through 
untaxed remote Internet sales and have created a firm resolution.  Instead of 
leaving the task of implementing a solution entirely to the states, Congress 
should enact legislation embracing the SSTP.  In the interim period, states 
should adopt use tax awareness campaigns and push for the permanent 
approval of a sales and use tax deduction for consumer purchases.  Taken as a 
whole, these measures will reduce the compliance burden on remote sellers, 
satisfy Commerce Clause and due process requirements, achieve tax policy 
objectives by treating all vendors equally, and reduce consumer resistance to 
change. 
The Internet has changed the way the world transacts business and shares 
information.  It has also unwittingly exacerbated consumer tax evasion.  
 
 278. See Morris, supra note 21, at 1395 (noting that “in practice, many business purchasers 
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Undeniably, the Internet has sparked commerce and ingenuity, but in doing so, 
has cost states billions of dollars.  To preserve the financial integrity of states, 
tax laws must keep pace with the evolution of business. 
ERIC A. ESS 
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